(1983: 367) explains: "The remedy, of course, is not to tolerate such a perverse choice of primitive vocabulary." (∀x)Fx does not automatically count as the one and only fundamental law for the friend of Link, since F will almost certainly fail to be a fundamental property.
Secondly, Link explains certain features of scientific practice, and in particular why positing new (and potentially underlying) fundamental laws can require positing new (and potentially deeper) joints of nature. Thus Lewis (1983: 368) says that both his account of laws and Armstrong's can explain:
…why the scientific investigation of laws and of properties is a package deal; why physicists posit natural properties such as the quark colors in order to posit the laws in which those properties figure, so that laws and natural properties get discovered together.
For instance, imagine that physicists succeed in explaining the contemporary "standard model" of particle theory by treating particles as composed of oscillating strings. It would then seem perverse to refuse to take this as offering any insight into the fundamental reality beyond the standard model. Thirdly, Link helps provide an epistemology for the fundamental properties. For Armstrong, Lewis, and the contemporary orthodoxy, fundamental properties are a brute metaphysical posit. There is a concern that this renders them epistemically inaccessible. In this vein Sider (2011: 11) notes the question: "How are we supposed to know-or even, reasonably believe-anything about structure?" Given that one has some independent grip (presumably from physics) on what the fundamental laws of nature are, Link allows one to use this grip on the fundamental laws to grasp at least some of the fundamental properties (c.f. Lewis 1986: 60) .
Putting this together, Link is orthodoxy for at least the following three reasons:
• Link keeps gruesome properties out of the fundamental laws;
• Link explains certain features of scientific practice, such as why positing new fundamental laws can require positing new joints of nature; and • Link helps provide an epistemology for the fundamental properties.
We think that Link is false, but we think that there is something insightful in these three points, and we owe a story about how to preserve these insights without Link ( §4).
So much for the content of, and rationale behind, Link. We should note that Link is neutral on what makes a property fundamental, beyond the bare claim that fundamentality is an objective metaphysical status. Link is neutral as to whether fundamental properties are sparse universals (Armstrong 1978) , exact resemblance classes of spare tropes (Campbell 1990 ), or privileged class of possibilia (Lewis 1986: 64) , and Link is also neutral as to whether fundamental properties are categorical or dispositional (c.f. Shoemaker 1980 , Bird 2007 .
Link is equally neutral on what makes a law fundamental, beyond the bare claim that this too is an objective metaphysical status. By a "fundamental law" we just mean a scientifically familiar posit, of which Newton's second law F=ma and Schrödinger's equation are historical candidates. Perhaps a law is For instance, Armstrong (1983: 73) charges that "the Systematic approach mistakes good methodology about laws for analytic truths about lawhood." But as a result Armstrong equally needs to explain why it would be bad methodology to treat (∀x)Fx as the one and only fundamental law. Likewise Carroll (1994: 45) describes the Lewisian approach as "shaped by the epistemology of lawhood" and using concepts "of the appropriate nature to be part of the epistemology of lawhood." As a result Carroll equally needs to explain why it would be poor reasoning to infer that (∀x)Fx is the one and only fundamental law. fundamental when it corresponds to a second-order necessitation universal (Dretske 1977 , Tooley 1977 , Armstrong 1978 ) or a second-order necessitation trope, or when it serves as an axiom of the best systematization of nature (Lewis 1983 : 369, Earman 1984 , Loewer 1996 . Or perhaps a law is fundamental when it reflects the fundamental powers (Bird 2007: 13) , or reflects the essential properties of the natural kind to which our world belongs (Bigelow, Ellis, and Lierse 1992) , or best systematizes the possible distributions of powers (Demarest forthcoming) , or when it is found at a certain strata of the subnomically counterfactually stable hierarchy of truths (Lange 2009: 41) . Or perhaps fundamental laws are simply a primitive and sui generis aspect of the fundamental fabric of reality (Maudlin 2007a) . We think our discussion ultimately favors deflationary views of laws as mere summaries ( §4), but this is something we are arguing for by rejecting Link, not presupposing when stating it.
Thus the core commitment of Link is the idea that only metaphysically elite properties can appear in candidate fundamental laws like F=ma. This is the claim we are challenging.
Extant challenges
There are three main extant challenges to Link, and we conclude this introductory section by situating our challenge. The first sort of challenge is a radical "challenge from the outside" which rejects the very terms in which Link is cast, either by rejecting the notion of a metaphysically distinguished property (Hirsch 2009 ), or by rejecting laws (c.f. Cartwright 1983 , van Fraassen 1989 , Mumford 2004 ). We are not disputing the terms in which Link is cast, but merely denying the claim that Link makes with these terms. Our challenge is a more moderate "challenge from the inside." 3 A second sort of challenge-discussed by Hawthorne (2006: 236-37 )-concerns the metaphysics of quantity. Candidate fundamental laws like F=ma record relations between determinable quantities, and it is not clear that determinable quantities belong to the fundamental structure of reality: one might worry that the fundamental properties need to be maximally determinate and/or scale-invariant. Indeed on standard views about quantity one starts from a pattern of relations-either second-order relations between the properties (Mundy 1987) or first-order relations between the objects involved (Field 1980 )-and then proves a representation theorem authorizing the use of numbers. It is then natural to think that the quantities appearing in the laws (e.g. mass) derive from these relations (e.g. mass-betweenness and mass-congruence). If so this provides an argument against Link.
We think this is an important worry and find the metaphysics of quantity perplexing, but for present purposes would just clarify that our worry is independent, and perhaps stronger in two respects. First, the standard metaphysical views of quantity are presumably not truisms to practicing scientists. Secondly, on the standard views about quantity the underlying fundamentals are still "in the vicinity" of the quantities appearing in the laws (e.g. they are all massy). In contrast, our challenge involves textbookobvious cases of properties defined in intuitively quite distinct terms, and thus can claim to be fully transparent to scientific practice. 4 The third main challenge-due primarily to van Fraassen (1989) and Loewer (2007) -concerns lack of epistemic access to fundamental properties. Thus Loewer (2007: 322) -drawing on van 3 Our main argument can be put in neutral terms: assuming that F=ma is a fit candidate for being a fundamental law, and assuming that there are fundamental properties (which are not defined, not overly disjunctive, etc.), we can see that 'F' and 'a' are evidently nonfundamental. 4 Perhaps the reason why scientists use determinable quantities like mass rather than patterns of relations (and might continue to do so even if aware of the metaphysical concerns) is that it is simpler to use determinable quantities, and incredibly fruitful for directly connecting to mathematics. If so then this argument and ours may ultimately converge on the idea that considerations of simplicity and utility call for the use of derivative properties in fundamental laws. We thank Marco Dees for discussion. Fraassen's (1989: 55-59) charge that Lewisian laws fail to fit scientific practice-imagines that the laws might prove more cumbersome stated in fundamental terms than in derivative terms, and suggests that in such a case scientific practice would favor choosing the simpler formulation in derivative terms. As Loewer (2007: 323-24) clarifies, he is not denying that there are fundamental properties in nature, but only claiming that such properties "do not play the constitutive role that Lewis claims for them in characterizing the [Best Systems Account] of laws."
Our worry is very much in the vicinity of Loewer's, but distinct (and we think stronger) in two main respects. First, Loewer's worry is presented purely hypothetically, in terms of an imagined mismatch between two ways of stating the laws. His verdict that scientific practice would favor the simpler formulation featuring derivative properties is an imagined verdict, which strikes us as plausible, but could certainly be challenged. In contrast, our claim is based on actual physics, involving an actual mismatch between the terms scientists in fact use to formulate Newtonian laws and the fundamental properties of Newtonian mechanics. Our verdict about scientific practice is thus more secure.
The second main difference between Loewer's worry and our own is that Loewer's worry is primarily epistemic, connected to van Fraassen's concern that Lewisian perfectly natural properties are a brute metaphysical posit inaccessible to us. Our claim is instead based on the idea that within a given system (e.g. Newtonian mechanics) we can actually see that certain properties are defined properties, and hence cannot be perfectly natural. We thus offer a positive means of seeing that certain properties are derivative. Putting these two points of difference together: we are not worried about a hypothetical scenario (as per van Fraassen and Loewer) in which the scientists have come to a best system which, unbeknownst to them, happens not to be couched in fundamental terms. Rather we are worried about an actual scenario in which scientists have come to a best system which they themselves know to be cast in derivative terms.
Counterexamples
We have stated and motivated Link, and situated our challenge: a closer look at candidate fundamental laws like F=ma reveals that their predicates are defined terms. We will primarily focus on F=ma (with a brief glance at Newton's law of gravitation: f G =Gm 1 m 2 /r 2 ), and now argue that both 'F' and 'a' are clearly derivative terms, by the lights of Newtonian mechanics. We thus think that Link is wrong even about our most central historical paradigms of candidate fundamental laws.
We are focusing on F=ma because it is a paradigm case of a law taken to be fundamental by practicing scientists, and because of its likely familiarity to our readers. Though we will later ( §3) show that parallel issues arise in Lagrangian mechanics and in Hamiltonian mechanics, as well as in quantum mechanics (Schrödinger's equation includes a term for the Hamiltonian). F=ma is not merely our most central historical case of paradigmatic lawhood; it proves to be a representative case with respect to featuring derivative properties.
Newtonian acceleration
So we begin with Newtonian acceleration, the determinable quantity denoted by 'a'. Acceleration is a defined quantity within Newtonian mechanics, defined as the second derivative of position. That is, if one starts with the idea of a body having a position, one can define velocity as the first derivative of position: velocity is the rate of change of position. Then one can define acceleration as the second derivative: acceleration is the rate of change of velocity, or the rate of change of the rate of change of position. And so one sees a derivative mathematically defined notion showing up in a candidate fundamental law. 5 We want to make explicit that we are not trying to make a pun on 'derivative'. Our point about acceleration is that it is a defined notion, defined out of the prior notions of position and time. The definition also happens to use the mathematical notion of a derivative, but that is inessential to our point.
Why write 'F=ma' with 'a'? One does so for simplicity. One could insist on writing 'F=m(dv/dt)' instead, or even replacing 'dv/dt' with 'd 2 x/dt 2 '. But that would seem perverse, since one has to hand the defined quantity a = (dv/dt). So with Newtonian acceleration it emerges that it is simpler, and hence preferable, to write the fundamental laws in derivative terms. We would emphasize that the status of Newtonian acceleration as defined is an elementary matter. All the practicing physicists realize that acceleration is a derivative notion in Newtonian mechanics, but use this derivative notion in formulating the fundamental laws for Newtonian mechanics because it simplifies the equations.
Newtonian force
We turn now to Newtonian force, which actually presents two challenges for Link (and provides more insight into the role of derivative properties in laws). The first challenge sticks to F=ma and notes that 'F'-like 'a'-is clearly a derivative term within Newtonian mechanics. 'F' denotes the resultant force on a given body. But resultant force is defined as the vector sum of the component forces. For instance, if we start with a body o subject to exactly three component forces f 1 , f 2 , and f 3 , then
Why write 'F=ma' with 'F'? Again one does so in part for simplicity. One could insist on universally quantifying over component forces, and introducing a vector-summation operator thereover, writing '
But that would again seem perverse, since one has to hand the defined quantity
. Actually even the notion of a component force is disjunctive within Newtonian mechanics since it collapses gravitational and electrical forces, so one might even insist on writing '
', So with Newtonian resultant force it again emerges that it is simpler, and hence preferable, to write the fundamental law in derivative terms. Indeed, part of the reason why scientists bother to define notions like acceleration and resultant force is to simplify the laws.
There is a second independent reason to write 'F=ma' with 'F' rather than '
', which is that using 'F' preserves neutrality as to which component forces there are. This allows physicists to use F=ma in models with different hypothetical component force law packages. Indeed a crucial part of the historical development of Newtonian mechanics consisted of using F=ma as a way to test various hypotheses about component forces: Newton's original lawbook (1687) only posits f G , to which Coulomb's law positing f C was a later addition (1785).
7 Moreover, a crucial aspect of the application of Newtonian mechanics consists of using F=ma in contexts where we only have an approximate force law (e.g. friction), nonfundamental forces (e.g. Hooke's spring law), or even fictitious forces (e.g. centrifugal force). With 'F' the resulting system of laws is not just simpler but also more modular, and hence both more resilient and more useful to the practicing scientist.
Newtonian force also presents a second challenge to Link, one which takes into account both F=ma and Newton's law of gravitation: f G =Gm 1 m 2 /r 2 . The total Newtonian lawbook invokes both resultant force (F) and specific component forces (f G -also f C if we cast an eye to Coulomb's law). But resultant force and specific component forces cannot both be fundamental notions (leaving open which if either might be fundamental), on grounds that the fundamental properties are amenable to free recombination, but resultant and component forces are mathematically related and so not freely recombinable. To say that the fundamental properties are freely recombinable is to say that any distribution of fundamental properties is metaphysically possible. If resultant and specific component forces were freely recombinable, this would entail that it was metaphysically possible for something to be subject to any combination of component forces but no resultant (or some other resultant that differs arbitrarily from the sum of the components). But this is mathematically and hence metaphysically impossible. And so resultant force and special component forces cannot both be fundamental. Since both appear in the total Newtonian lawbook, we conclude that derivative properties must appear in fundamental laws somewhere in the Newtonian lawbook (leaving open exactly where).
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(We also note that f G =Gm 1 m 2 /r 2 makes reference to the distance relation, which in Newtonian mechanics is also a defined notion, defined in terms of difference in absolute position. That is, the distance between body o 1 at coordinates <x 1 , y 1 , z 1 > and body o 2 at <x 2 , y 2 , z 2 > is defined as the square root of the squared difference along each dimension:
We do not focus on this example only because absolute position turns out to be internally problematic "surplus structure" within Newtonian mechanics. But we would still point out that, even before physicists realized how to do without absolute position, they were still perfectly happy to formulate fundamental laws invoking terms like 'r' which they regarded as defined.)
So we conclude that Link must be broken. In what is perhaps the most historically paradigmatic example of a candidate fundamental law, one can see that two of the three terms are not fundamental but derivative. Derivative terms are employed to simplify the equations (this is part of why these terms are worth introducing), and to render the resulting system more modular. If scientific practice is any guide, derivative properties can appear in fundamental laws.
Replies
We have argued that Link is false. Drawing on an examination of 'a' and 'F' in F=ma, we have argued that derivative properties can appear in fundamental laws when it simplifies the equations and/or improves the modularity of the system. We now turn to consider potential replies, of which we will consider three.
Newtonian acceleration and force as fundamental?
First, one might reply that acceleration and resultant force are candidate fundamental properties after all. This reply is hard to credit: acceleration and resultant force are both clearly defined notions within Newtonian mechanics. Moreover there is no prospect of trying to "reverse the definitions," since for instance there is no definition of specific component forces in terms of resultant force. This is because resultant force is a vector which is multiply decomposable. Indeed, if one starts with the idea that a given body is subject to a given resultant force, one cannot recover (i) which specific component forces there are, (ii) which components of the resultant are due to which specific component forces, and (iii) which individual specific component forces went into a total specific component force.
Perhaps the best prospect for treating acceleration as fundamental is to treat properties as coarsegrained. The idea is to claim that 'a' denotes the very same property as does 'dv/dt' and 'd 2 x/dt 2 ', and so conclude that these are just variant means of denoting one and the same perfectly natural property. Whether one can treat properties as coarse-grained in this way depends in part on the underlying metaphysics of fundamental properties, over which we are trying to remain neutral ( §1). For instance, if one is working with classes of possibilia ala Lewis, then one indeed winds up with a coarse-grained conception of properties on which 'a', 'dv/dt', and 'd 2 x/dt 2 ', are co-denoting. But if one is working with structured expressions and testing individual constituents for being joint-carving ala Sider, then one winds up with a finer-grained conception that virtually requires us to distinguish between the status of predicates such as 'a', 'dv/dt', and 'd 2 x/dt 2 '.
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But regardless of the prospects for treating acceleration as fundamental, there seems to be no prospect of extending this idea to Newtonian force, for two reasons. First, 'F' and '
are not co-denoting even on highly coarse-grained conceptions (such as Lewis's), so long as it is possible for there to be different component forces (a possibility which played a crucial role in the historical development of Newtonian mechanics: §2). ('F' and 'Σf' have a better claim to being co-denoting, but recall that 'Σf' is disjunctive within Newtonian mechanics: §2.) Secondly, even granting arguendo that 'F' and '
' are co-denoting, the property denoted is clearly not fundamental (likewise for ' !,! ! ! '). For the property denoted is wildly disjunctive, and contributes nothing whatsoever to similarities or to the intrinsic characters of things (as orthodoxy requires of fundamental properties: c.f. Lewis 1983: 356-57) . If two things are subject to the same resultant force, they may be embedded in radically different environments so long as the surrounding distribution of mass and charge generates component forces with a common sum, and they may themselves be arbitrarily different from each other: one might be an electron and the other a kaon, a kangaroo, or a comet. (In the other direction, two things may be intrinsic duplicates-for instance both might be electrons-yet subject to different resulting forces due to being embedded in different environments.) What emerges is that Newtonian resultant force is not merely a defined quantity within Newtonian mechanics, but it bears multiple further signs of failing to carve at the joints.
F=ma as nonfundamental?
As a second reply to our argument, one might reply that F=ma is not really a candidate fundamental law after all. But this reply is even harder to credit, since it flies in the face of centuries of scientific practice. The least plausible version of this reply would directly rule out F=ma for including defined terms like 'F' and 'a' (or rule out f G =Gm 1 m 2 /r 2 for including terms like 'f G '). This would be blindly dogmatic. The metaphysician should not insist that the physicist has misdescribed the laws, just because the physicist's description does not fit some metaphysical preconception.
A more interesting version of this second reply begins from the observation that there are historically important mathematically equivalent reformulations of Newtonian mechanics that do not involve F=ma. One such reformulation is Lagrangian mechanics (1788), for which the central dynamical law is:
10 where L (the Lagrangian) is defined as L = K-V, which is the total kinetic energy of the system K minus the total potential energy of the system V. And indeed K itself is a defined notion in Lagrangian mechanics (defined from velocity), as is V (defined-in ways partly reminiscent of the definition of resultant force in Newtonian mechanics-as the vector sum of the gravitational potentials and the electrical potentials). Another such reformulation is Hamiltonian mechanics (1833) = or not? One might think of a fundamental law as fundamental on at least one choice of notation, in which case our point about F=ma containing nonfundamental terms remains, since F=ma will then be fundamental on one choice of notation. Or one might think of a fundamental law as fundamental on all choices of notation, in which case Newtonian mechanics would be devoid of fundamental laws altogether. This way lies one form of the radical challenge to orthodoxy which rejects fundamental laws altogether ( §1), and perhaps thinks of scientific theories instead via classes of models.
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Finally one might think of a fundamental law as fundamental on the one metaphysically preferred choice of notation. In that case our point about F=ma containing nonfundamental terms remains, so long as Newtonian mechanics is considered at least a historical candidate for preferred notation.
But if Newtonian, Lagrangian, and Hamiltonian mechanics are instead regarded as subtly different theories, then our case against Link is if anything strengthened. For now one finds three different historical candidate fundamental laws.
One-the central dynamical law of Newtonian mechanicsfeatures the defined terms 'a' and 'F'. But the others-the central dynamical law of Lagrangian mechanics and the central dynamical law of Hamiltonian mechanics-now feature the respective defined terms 'L' (defined as K-V) and 'H' (defined as K+V, or as p 2 /2m+V(x), or as the Legendre transform of L).
So what emerges from the consideration of alternative reformulations of Newtonian mechanics in Lagrangian and Hamiltonian terms is just further fuel for our fire: one finds further examples of candidate fundamental laws featuring derivative properties. If anything, the Lagrangian L and the Hamiltonian H are even more blatant examples of explicitly nonfundamental properties that still earn their keep in candidate fundamental laws. (Why are Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics worth working with? Because their equations are beautiful and coordinate-independent, and because one can use them to solve problems.)
We think that these first two replies are the only serious replies. For if F=ma really is a candidate fundamental law (pace the second reply), and if acceleration and resultant force are not candidate fundamental properties (pace the first reply), then Link must fall. But we conclude this consideration of 11 Alternatively, H is sometimes defined as H = p 2 /2m+V(x), which explicitly represents the total energy of the system as a function of position and momentum, or just as the Legendre transform of the Lagrangian L. What is interesting about the case of H in Hamiltonian mechanics is that it is not only an explicitly defined notion, but it is also a notion that lacks a unique canonical definition. Instead one finds H defined in different ways depending on the explanatory context. (For instance, the definition of H as the Legendre transform of L is-perhaps unsurprisinglyespecially useful when showing how to derive Hamiltonian mechanics from Lagrangian mechanics.) 12 We take the received view to be that Newtonian, Lagrangian, and Hamiltonian mechanics are merely notational variants. But the friend of Link seems committed to rejecting the received view, and instead regarding these theories as rivals, for positing different fundamental laws and hence different conceptions of how nature is jointed. That said, we are not sure if this is an objectionable commitment of Link. Indeed North (2009) argues that Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics are more objective and description-independent than Newtonian mechanics in virtue of being coordinate-independent, and that Hamiltonian mechanics is more parsimonious than Lagrangian mechanics in virtue of only having a volume structure without any surplus metric structure. 13 Thus van Fraassen (1989: 188) expresses his semantic view of scientific theories: " [T] o present a theory is to present a family of models. This family may be described in many ways, by means of different statements in different languages, and no linguistic formulation has any privileged status. Specifically, no importance attaches as such to axiomatization, and a theory may not even be axiomatizable in any non-trivial sense." replies by mentioning a third reply we have encountered, if only to fend off the misunderstandings it involves, and to take an opportunity to clarify our argument.
But our world is not Newtonian!
This third reply begins by dismissing Newtonian mechanics as a false theory (as of course it is), and then declares that the situation with a false theory such as Newtonian mechanics sheds no real light on Link. But this reply involves at least two misunderstandings. The first misunderstanding is empirical. Newtonian mechanics is false but quantum mechanics is still a going candidate for a true fundamental theory, and standard formulations of quantum mechanics involve Schrödinger's equation (1926), whose time-dependent expression is: ℏ ! !" Ψ = Ψ. The term ' ' is the Hamiltonian operator from Hamiltonian mechanics. So, in part due to the historical continuities of physics, our point about Hamiltonian mechanics remains applicable to quantum mechanics. 14 The second and perhaps deeper misunderstanding in this third reply is conceptual. For false scientific theories may still shed light on proposed metaphysical principles. The underlying issue is whether Link expresses a tenable constraint on fundamental laws, and Newtonian mechanics (false though it may be) provides one with historically real and indeed paradigmatic examples of what fundamental laws might look like. We are arguing that this example reveals Link to be false.
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To put this last point in a different way, which may help clarify our argument: we are giving an argument from scientific practice. We are arguing that scientists have in fact routinely used properties they deem non-fundamental to state the laws they deem fundamental. Thus, given that our understanding of the notion of a fundamental law must fit with scientific practice, it will be an understanding severed from Link. On this matter we agree with van Fraassen (1989: 56):
[A]ctual science begins with theories not know to be true, but in any case, not very simple, not very strong, with regrettable sacrifices of simplicity for strength or vice versa, and formulated with predicates for which we claim no virtue beyond familiarity.
Indeed, are saying something even stronger: actual science is not merely "formulated with predicates for which we claim no virtue beyond familiarity;" it is even formulated with predicates in which one can see the vice of the derived.
Conclusions
Suppose that we are right that Link is false: derivative properties can appear in fundamental laws. What follows? We conclude by considering some consequences, as well as some non-consequences.
What does not follow
It might help to start by clarifying what does not follow: it would not follow that there is no distinction between fundamental and derivative properties, nor would it follow that there is no distinction between fundamental and derivative laws. It would only follow that these distinctions do not line up as cleanly as orthodoxy supposes.
It would also not follow that the original rationales for Link ( §1) must be abandoned, or there is any less of a role for the Armstrong-Lewis posit of fundamental properties to play. As far as preserving the original rationales for Link, it may be useful to think of Link as deriving from the following background idea:
Background: Only eligible properties may appear in the fundamental laws.
Link is Background with 'eligible' interpreted as fundamental. But other interpretations are possible as well. For instance, one might interpret 'eligible' as merely natural enough. This would yield:
Weakened Link: Only natural enough properties may appear in the fundamental laws.
After all, F and a in Newtonian mechanics are defined terms but the definitions are simple and straightforward, which we take to be a sign of a non-hideously-gruesome property. 16 Or one might go in for a more holistic and multi-dimensional conception of eligibility, on which families of properties get an eligibility score, which might be a joint function of their overall degrees of naturalness plus the usefulness of the equations they engender:
Holistic Link: Only properties in the best family may appear in the fundamental laws.
Our point is that one can accept Background without going in for the simple-minded conception of eligibility as fundamentality that yields Link.
Once it is seen that everything we have said is compatible with either Weakened Link or Holistic Link, it can be seen that all of the original rationales for Link can be retained. These were ( §1):
First, both Weakened Link and Holistic Link will equally serve to keep gruesome properties out of fundamental laws, and thus to explain why Lewis's trivializing axiomatization '(∀x)Fx' does not automatically state the one and only fundamental law, given that F will almost certainly be hideously gruesome/holistically ineligible. Secondly, both Weakened Link and Holistic Link explain why positing new fundamental laws can require positing new joints of nature. If physicists succeed in explaining the contemporary "standard model" of particle theory by treating particles as composed of oscillating strings, then would then require oscillations to be natural enough or holistically eligible (respectively), and we would get some (albeit indirect) insight into fundamental reality. Thirdly, both Weakened Link and Holistic Link would give us some (again indirect) grasp on the fundamental.
Indeed both Weakened Link and Holistic Link preserve a role (albeit a less direct role) for metaphysically elite properties in the fundamental laws, and so both would sustain a law-based motivation for the Armstrong-Lewis posit of fundamental properties. So we think that, rather than undermining the Armstrong-Lewis posit, the rejection of Link actually helps liberate this posit from the false image of science it has hitherto been tied to. So here is a first thing that follows: a liberation of the Armstrong-Lewis posit of fundamental properties from a false metaphysical image.
Alternative hypotheses about the fundamental
What follows if Link is false is not just a liberation of the Armstrong-Lewis posit of fundamental properties, but also a liberation of hypotheses about which properties are fundamental. For instance, it has been argued that the fundamental properties are holistic features of the world (c.f. Campbell 1990 , Albert 1996 , Schaffer 2009 ). Thus Schaffer (2009: 59-60) maintains that the fundamental properties are distributional properties of the entire cosmos (e.g. having such-and-such a total distribution of mass). Space precludes a serious engagement with these ideas. But suffice it to say that we think that there are interesting empirical and conceptual considerations (including quantum entanglement) that may favor this sort of holistic approach, and regard it as a serious contender.
But Link would underwrite a quick argument against a holistic approach to fundamental properties (whatever other virtues such approaches might have), since these properties do not seem to fit the simplest laws. To illustrate, the mass properties appearing in candidate fundamental laws such as F=ma are the mass properties of various individual bodies (those subject to resultant forces, and thereby liable to accelerations), not the total mass distribution of the entire cosmos. Insofar as mass properties of individual bodies and the total mass distribution of the entire cosmos cannot both be fundamental (for the same combinatorial reasons that tell against component and resultant forces both being fundamental: §2), such a holistic approach-whatever advantages it might otherwise claim-would be out of the running. This seems too quick.
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But replacing Link with alternatives like Weakened Link or Holistic Link would allow one to reconcile holistic approaches to fundamental properties with simpler laws stated in other terms. The quick argument sketched above would not go through. (One might still try to argue against the holistic approach using Weakened Link and/or Holistic Link, but that would take a lot more work, and we doubt any such argument would succeed.) So we think that breaking from Link may also help open the door for some further hypotheses about fundamental properties which might be otherwise plausible, perhaps including the holistic approach.
A deflationary conclusion about laws
If Link is false it also follows that certain influential and inflationary views of laws as governing the fundamental are falsified, and that the deflationary conception of laws as summarizing gains support. To illustrate the sort of view that we think is falsified, consider Armstrong's (1978: ch. 24; conception of laws as relating sparse universals. Armstrong conceives of laws as second-order necessitation universals of the form N (F, G) , where F and G are first-order sparse categorical universals. But given that acceleration and force are not fundamental properties, they do not correspond to sparse universals. And so F=ma cannot have the form that Armstrong claims laws must have. Fundamental laws need not relate sparse universals. Armstrong's view of laws is thus inextricably bound to Link. Nor is there any straightforward way to restate Armstrong's view given Weakened Link or Holistic Link, since for Armstrong the merely natural enough and the merely eligible properties are not universals, and hence cannot be connected by second-order universals.
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17 Indeed given the natural bias of scientists to equations applicable to lab experiments, there are natural practical reasons for them to prefer laws applicable to local systems. Aspects of laws that trace merely to the practical preference of experimenters ought not play a role in evaluating what is fundamental. 18 Dretske (1977) and Tooley (1977) equally treat laws as relations between universals, but do not commit to the thesis of universals as sparse (/fundamental properties). They thus uphold the idea of laws as governing, but are not committed to the idea of laws as governing the fundamental. Indeed Tooley is explicitly an abundant Platonist about Generalizing, we take Armstrong's conception of lawhood to exemplify a metaphysically inflationary picture of laws as governing the fundamental, as per:
Fundamental Governing: Fundamental laws operate on fundamental properties, governing their distribution through spacetime.
The picture of Fundamental Governing is familiar from a wide range of historical and contemporary authors, and traces back to the Cartesian conception of laws as divine decrees (Milton 1998: 699; c.f. van Fraassen 1989 : 5-7, Beebee 2000 . As an illustrative example, Maudlin (2007b: 182) describes this picture as one strand of "our initial picture of the world":
[T]he fundamental asymmetry in the passage of time is inherent in our basic initial conception of the world, and the fundamental status of the laws of physics is, I think, implicit in physical practice. Both of the strands of our initial picture of the world weave together in the notion of a productive explanation, or account, of the physical universe itself. The universe, as well as the smaller parts of it, is made: it is an ongoing enterprise, generated from a beginning and guided towards its future by physical law.
This picture views nomic connections as threads through the fundamental fabric of reality, holding it all together and governing how the fabric rolls out through time, thereby allowing for a distinctive sort of explanatory connection between events which no mere deflationary conception of lawhood can match.
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Fundamental Governing entails Link. For if the fundamental laws "operate" on the fundamental properties, then they must relate the fundamental properties (rather than merely derivative properties). That is, given that the fundamental fabric of reality consists in instances of fundamental properties in spacetime, derivative properties are not to be found in this fundamental fabric, are hence not in line for any imagined nomic threads to lace together.
So given that Link is false, Fundamental Governing must be false. The fundamental laws need no longer be directly connected with the fundamental structure of nature. In a Newtonian regime, F=ma cannot be governing fundamental reality, because acceleration and resultant force are not part of the fundamental fabric of reality. They are not there for any fundamental lawgiver to govern, nor for any fundamental nomic thread to lace. Nor is there any straightforward way to restate this picture given Weakened Link or Holistic Link, since the merely natural enough and the merely holistically eligible properties are still not part of the fundamental fabric of reality.
statement involving a derivative predicate should carry over to the law it corresponds to involving a derivative property, so the proponent of Fundamental Governing will find no solace.
But if the proponent of Fundamental Governing denies that laws and laws-statement have a direct correspondence, then we wonder what she even has in mind by "laws." All she will be able to display are law-statements. And we wonder why she should think that scientific practice supports belief in such laws. All she will find in the textbooks are law-statements. Separated and distanced from the law-statements that do all the work in science, her "laws" become a mere metaphysical invention.
If Link is false, not only is Fundamental Governing false, but a rival deflationary conception of laws as summarizing gains support (c.f. Lewis 1996 : §IV, Beebee 2000 : 578-80, Loewer 2007 . To illustrate the sort of view that we think gains support, consider the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis (Lewis 1983: 366-68) conception of laws as the summary of the occurrences, cast in eligible terms, which optimally balances simplicity and strength. Of course we are rejecting Lewis's identification of eligible terms with fundamental terms. We-in agreement with Loewer (2007) -would instead say that simplicity and related factors are playing a role, not just in the contest between rival summaries cast in antecedently eligible terms, but also in the very contest to be an eligible term. For we see that definitionally connected families of notions like position, velocity, and acceleration, and also like gravitational force, electrical force, and resultant force, are all available for summarizing a Newtonian world.
Generalizing, we take Lewis's conception of lawhood to exemplify a metaphysically deflationary picture of laws as summarizing, as per:
Summarizing: Fundamental laws are the axioms of best summaries.
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There are three respects in which we take Summarizing to gain support (of an abductive sort). First, insofar as "summary virtues" like simplicity and utility explain the presence of derivative properties in fundamental laws ( §2), we see that the laws are implicitly selected to serve as summaries. The most natural answer for why F=ma finds its way into the Newtonian lawbook despite its use of transparently derivative properties is that the Newtonian lawbook with F=ma achieves such a beautiful balance of simplicity and strength.
Secondly, we see that Summarizing-at least unlike one of its main rivals, Fundamental Governing-is not bound to Link. At most Summarizing seems tied to Background, and is compatible with various different ways of characterizing eligibility, including not just Link but also Weakened Link and Holistic Link. One merely needs to weaken Lewis's requirement that the summary be cast in perfectly natural terms, and the rest of the picture can remain intact.
Thirdly, Summarizing is threatened by intuitions generated by the picture of laws as governing the fundamental (Loewer 2007) . The deflationary summarizing conception struggles to capture the intuition which Maudlin nicely describes in terms of the universe being "guided towards its future by physical law." Insofar as we have shown that this intuition is bound to Link and thereby generated by a false metaphysical image, we have also defused what might be the main threat to Summarizing.
